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Abstract Housing is an area in which the active involvement of citizens in the
provision of services has the potential to enrich individual lifestyles, local com-
munities and the organisations providing housing, regardless of whether public,
private for-profit or non-profit. Yet in current housing markets, housing tends to be
purely individual, in the form of home ownership, or collectively managed through
social rented housing. The article explores the conditions under which co-produc-
tion in this field could be successful, as an alternative model. The analysis, which
draws upon the work of Ostrom, is based on empirical fieldwork carried out among
German housing cooperatives. As it turns out, successful co-production depends
primarily on the long-term maintenance of group boundaries and specific trajecto-
ries of organisational development. This can make co-production an attractive
model for specific social groups, but there are drawbacks: it also tends to lead to
limited use of the invested capital and an inward orientation.
Re´sume´ Logement est une zone dans laquelle la participation active des citoyens
dans la prestation de services a le potentiel d’enrichir les modes de vie individuels,
collectivite´s locales et les organismes de fourniture de logements, peu importe si le
public, prive´ a` but lucratif ou a` but non lucratif. Encore dans les marche´s du
logement, logement tend a` eˆtre purement individuelle, sous la forme d’accession a`
la proprie´te´ ou ge´re´s collectivement par l’entremise de logement locatif social. Cet
article explore les conditions en vertu de laquelle coproduction dans ce domaine
pourrait eˆtre couronne´e de succe`s, comme un mode`le alternatif. L’analyse, qui
s’inspire des travaux de Ostrom, repose sur empirique sur le terrain re´alise´ aupre`s de
coope´ratives de logement allemand. Il s’ave`re que, coproduction re´ussie repose
principalement sur le maintien a` long terme de limites de groupe et des trajectoires
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de de´veloppement organisationnel. Ceci peut rendre le co-produit un mode`le
attrayant pour des groupes sociaux spe´cifiques, mais il existe des inconve´nients :
elle a aussi tendance a` mener a` l’utilisation limite´e du capital investi et une
orientation vers l’inte´rieur.
Zusammenfassung Geha¨use ist ein Bereich, in dem die aktive Beteiligung der
Bu¨rger an der Erbringung von Dienstleistungen das Potenzial hat, individuelle
Lebensstile, Gemeinden und Organisationen Geha¨use, unabha¨ngig davon, ob die
o¨ffentlichen, privaten Profit oder Non-Profit zu bereichern. Noch tendenziell in
aktuellen Wohnungsma¨rkte, Geha¨use rein individuell, in Form von Wohneigentum
oder durch soziale Mietwohnungen gemeinsam verwalteten. Der Artikel untersucht
die Bedingungen unter denen Koproduktion in diesem Bereich erfolgreich, als ein
alternatives Modell sein ko¨nnte. Die Analyse, die auf den Arbeiten von Ostrom
zieht, basiert auf empirischen Feldforschung bei deutschen Wohnungsbau Genos-
senschaften durchgefu¨hrt. Wie sich herausstellt, ha¨ngt erfolgreiche Co-Produktion
vor allem die langfristige Erhaltung der Grenzen und bestimmte Bahnen der
Organisationsentwicklung. Diese kann Koproduktion ein attraktives Modell fu¨r
bestimmte soziale Gruppen machen, aber es gibt Nachteile: es neigt auch zu be-
grenzten Verwendung des eingesetzten Kapitals und eine innere Orientierung
fu¨hren.
Resumen La vivienda es un a´rea en la cual la participacio´n activa de los ciu-
dadanos en la prestacio´n de servicios tiene el potencial para enriquecer los estilos de
vida individuales, las comunidades locales y las organizaciones proporcionar aloj-
amiento, independientemente de si es pu´blico, privado con fines de lucro o sin fines
de lucro. Au´n en los actuales mercados de la vivienda, vivienda tiende a ser
puramente individual, en forma de propiedad de la vivienda, o colectivamente
gestionada a trave´s de viviendas sociales de alquiler. El artı´culo explora las con-
diciones bajo las cual coproduccio´n en este campo podrı´an tener e´xito, como un
modelo alternativo. El ana´lisis, que se basa en el trabajo de Ostrom, se basa en
campo empı´rica llevada a cabo entre las cooperativas de vivienda alema´n. Como
resulta, coproduccio´n exitoso depende principalmente en el mantenimiento a largo
plazo de las fronteras del grupo y trayectorias especı´ficas de desarrollo organizac-
ional. Esto puede hacer coproduccio´n un modelo atractivo para determinados grupos
sociales, pero hay desventajas: tambie´n tiende a conducir a un uso limitado de
capital invertido y una orientacio´n hacia adentro.
Keywords Co-production  Housing  Participation  Cooperatives  Collective
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Introduction
In recent years, it has often been argued that self-organisation and active citizenship
need to be encouraged (Verschuere et al. 2012). This also applies to the field of
housing. Few would deny that it would be desirable for more citizens to become
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more actively involved in their living environment. That much is clear. What is less
obvious is what can specifically be done to encourage this involvement.1
Many of today’s private social landlords were originally born out of initiatives
undertaken by citizens and communities who wanted to create an alternative to the
existing supply on the housing market. Yet civic involvement in housing has tended
to decrease over time. Bureaucratisation, mergers and up-scaling have meant that
existing suppliers of housing have become estranged from the communities which
they were once active in or, in the case of private non-profit organisations, which
they were once linked to. When these suppliers are positioned somewhere between
the state, the market and civil society (Brandsen and Karre´ 2012), they have tended
to move towards either the state or the market: civil society seems to be a weak
point. The question is whether they can re-strengthen this link with civil society.
In order to answer this question, we have searched for other forms of organisation
in the field of housing, which might be better placed to mobilise the civic potential
of their residents. We have carried out research among small-scale cooperatives in
Germany, which in terms of their social dynamics come close to what we would
understand as co-production. These cooperatives are so widespread that they cannot
simply be dismissed as a marginal phenomenon. They thus constitute a ‘critical
case’ which could shed light on the circumstances under which co-production could
be made to work in the field of housing.
First, we will set out our theoretical foundation and methodological choices. We
will then focus on the specific functions of housing as a capital good, a consumer
good and a form of social investment. We will then describe our empirical
investigation of German housing cooperatives. This will lead us to the formulation
of some conditions that need to be met in order for successful co-production in this
area to be able to occur. Inevitably, this leads to the ambition to achieve effective
co-production within small communities and the desire for an effective use of
capital and other resources for the broader environment beyond those communities.
We end the article with a suggestion for how to resolve the tension.
The Interaction Between Individual Motivation and Collective Action
Individual Motivation and Collective Action
To analyse co-production properly, we first need a clear picture of the motivations
of the citizens involved. Co-production in the field of housing must begin with
communities of individuals with a shared goal. How does this shared goal come
about, and how does it stand the test of time? This will be the starting point of our
analysis.
We will begin our exploration with a quotation from former British Prime
Minister, Margaret Thatcher: ‘‘There is no such thing as society. There are only
1 For a more elaborate description of this case and specifically of its position within the field of housing,




individual men and women’’ (Thatcher 1987). From this perspective on society, the
individual assumes the most important place, and what is more, it is assumed that an
individual acts solely and exclusively out of self-interest. Any collective interest
that people may share is, from this perspective, simply the sum of their individual
interests. Under Thatcher’s individualistic approach, it is difficult to understand and
explain collective action. In reality, we can observe that people are certainly capable
of organising themselves in such a way that they can accomplish goals that would
remain unattainable if they all acted as individuals. We also know that people often
act out of mixed motivations. In other words, we want to achieve something good
for ourselves and for other people, and as long as we are confident that other people
want the same and will behave accordingly, we are prepared to contribute to
communal arrangements. In fact, collective arrangements that are based either on
self-interest or on altruism exclusively are, in practice, the least sustainable
(Le Grand 2003).
In this article, we will work on the basis that a contradiction between individual
and collective interests is one possible scenario, but not the only possibility. It is of
course possible that the interests of the individual and collective interest may not
coincide—for example, when collective investment detracts from the quality of life
of some residents and they oppose this investment. However, it is also possible for
the interests of the individual and the collective interest to coincide, for example
when an individual invests in communal property and by doing so enhances his own
quality of life. The question then becomes—how can housing be organised in such a
way that these two types of interest are made to coincide?
Previous research has shown that people need rules and structures for this. The
question is which (types of) rules and structures will bring about an alignment of
individual interests with collective interests? This has always been an important
issue in social science and remains an extremely complicated question for today’s
policymakers. Within social science, where the dilemma of collective action is
essential, an exception is often made for small-scale, voluntary arrangements. The
sociologist Mary Douglas put it this way: ‘‘Small-scale societies are different. Many
who are well apprised of the difficulty of explaining collective action within the
theory of rational choice are content to make exceptions. Smallness of scale gives
scope to interpersonal effects. […] Consequently, there seems to be no theoretical
problem about altruism when the social organization is very small’’ (Douglas 1986,
p. 2). But what is it precisely that makes a small group or organisation less
susceptible to the problems associated with collective action?
Such issues are at the heart of the work of Elinor Ostrom, who set out to discover
the conditions under which individual interests and community interests can be
aligned. More specifically, she researched the large variation in the ways in which
common-pool resources become institutionalised and are managed (Ostrom 1990,
2005). Common-pool resources are associated with specific collective action
problems that relate to the fact that the good involved is, by definition, semi-
collective. As shared resources or supplies, common-pool resources are significant
to all those entitled to use them, but individual members may end up using so much
of the resource that other members (or potential future members—and thus future
generations too) may be left without enough. Housing can be conceived of as a
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common-pool resource (Helderman 2007). More specifically, it can be seen as a
form of insurance against future investment risks in the field of housing. A dwelling,
for example, can serve as collateral for new investment and at a collective level, the
entire housing stock and the capital that is tied up in it can serve as a similar source
of funding for future investments (Kemeny 1995).
Elinor Ostrom’s research focused specifically on the question of under what
institutional conditions common-pool resources can be managed in a sustainable
way. Her research concerned communal water resources, but what she discovered
about the conditions that lead to successfully managed communal water resources
can easily be transferred to the management of housing stock. On the basis of
empirical research, she reached the following design principles for the successful
management of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990, p. 90).
• The boundaries of the common-pool resource itself and the group of users must
be clearly defined.
• Rules concerning use and provisions (such as the division of living space or
investment) must be adapted to local circumstances.
• Using collective choice mechanisms, the actors involved in the collective
housing stock must be given the opportunity to participate in decision making in
some way—whether directly or through representation.
• Monitoring must be carried out in a way that is transparent and accountable to
the actors involved.
• Sanctions for violations of the rules must be graduated according to the
seriousness of the violation.
• Social infrastructure must be put in place for the resolution of any conflicts that
arise between the actors involved.
• The right of the community to organise itself must not be undermined by
external authorities.
• When the common-pool resource is part of a larger system (such as the social
housing stock), activities involving the removal of resources from the system,
provision, monitoring and other relevant forms of management, must be
organised close to the local level.
In this article, we will demonstrate that several of these conditions apply to our
case study of co-production in housing. By implication, co-production in this field
can only succeed where certain social limitations are accepted and constantly
maintained.
Methodological Considerations
The German housing cooperatives were chosen for two reasons. Research had
already indicated that a number of the Wohnungsgenossenschaften had succeeded in
getting their residents to play a more active role in and around their immediate
living environment and that lively communities had formed around these
organisations. That made them an interesting case study through which to look at
co-production. Furthermore, the German cooperative housing sector houses a broad
cross-section of the population, and includes both recently established and much
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older organisations. This enabled us to form a varied picture of the various
phenomena in the sector and the development of co-production.
In Germany, housing cooperatives account for around 10 % of the housing
market. As such, Germany is one of Europe’s frontrunners when it comes to
cooperative housing (Harloe 1995). In the German housing market, housing bears a
closer resemblance to a consumer good than in Anglo-Saxon markets, where its
function as a capital good is more dominant (Muellbauer 1998; Helderman 2007).
This has been confirmed by research on household perceptions (Elsinga et al. 2007).
In Germany, owning one’s own home is perceived principally as a form of
investment in one’s future security. Any rise in the value of housing is assessed in
terms of its effect on securing one’s future housing needs, rather than in terms of
property. Tenants and home owners also share a very similar perception of the
economic value of their home in Germany (Tegeder and Helbrecht 2007). In Anglo-
Saxon countries, on the other hand, property markets are unstable and subject to
large price fluctuations, and tenants and home owners have a quite different
perception of their own homes. In fact, this observation reveals the first important
characteristic which can enable co-production in housing in the form of housing
cooperatives. The way in which the housing market is institutionalised and the
economic dynamic associated with it is a significant factor. Housing cooperatives
are better able to flourish in a stable housing market where the economic purpose of
housing is perceived principally in terms of its practical use.
Some years ago, large-scale quantitative research was carried out into the
Wohnungsgenossenschaften, which meant that some basic data concerning the scale
and institutional form(s) of this type of organisation in the German housing market
were already available (Expertenkommission Wohnungsgenossenschaften 2004).
This enabled us to concentrate our efforts on intensive research at the organisational
level. Some basic questions about structures and procedures were answered using
documentation analysis. In addition to that we carried out intensive case study
research. This was based on interviews with the board members, residents and
municipal officials in and around seven mainly smaller organisations. The
Wohnungsgenossenschaften we worked with were located in the cities of Berlin,
Hamburg and Munich, which enabled us to research the role of the cooperatives in
various types of local property markets.
The research was financed by Futura, a network of non-profit (social) housing
corporations in the Netherlands. The research objectives were arrived at in
consultation, but the authors of this article determined the research methods
themselves. Of course, given the scale of the research, it can only be seen as
exploratory in nature. Nevertheless, it does go some way to revealing the factors which
are behind successful co-production. Some of these factors are specific to the field of
housing and for that reason it is now necessary to take a closer look at this specific field.
The Functions of Housing
The conditions necessary for co-production are closely linked to the functions of the
product or service in question and with the consequences of co-production in a
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specific sector or field (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006). We will here analyse the field
of housing on the basis of its three functions: its capital function, consumer function
and social investment function (Brandsen and Helderman 2012). Each of these can
have an impact at various levels: at the level of the individual resident, or at higher,
collective levels such as that of the community which the resident belongs to, or of
the city as a whole.
The considerable investment required and the fact that this is often extended over
the long term means that housing has a function as a capital good. Most of the finance
is needed ‘up-front’ to make the purchase itself. Loans are often used to raise this
finance, sometimes in the form of a personal loan (a mortgage) or through the capital
market. An important choice is the extent to which profits or losses from sale of the
dwelling are passed on. When the dwelling is the property of an individual home
owner, the resident shares directly in the increase (or decrease) in its value. When a
property is owned collectively, the range of possibilities is greater. If the sum paid by
the individual for using the property is independent of any changes in the value of the
property, capital profits can also be used to maintain the collective property and make
new investments. At the collective level, the capital function can thus be translated
into an arrangement that provides maximum security of tenure. Traditional German
housing cooperatives, for example, expressly emphasise this type of security, which
is passed on to the residents at an individual level.
In addition to the capital function, housing has a consumer function. Simply,
people need a roof over their heads. However, housing can also fulfil several
consumer functions simultaneously. When residents live together in a shared
residential environment, they can also help and support each other in various aspects
of their lifestyles. Parents can babysit for each other’s children, and people with
handicaps can give each other a helping hand. Individual interests are thus served by
the community, enhancing the consumer function of housing.
Finally, housing has a social investment function. Housing provides the
opportunity to realise social ideals such as empowerment. The housing market
has always been closely associated with socio-economic status and social mobility.
Ecological sustainability is also becoming ever more prominent nowadays as an
ideal to be put into practice. All this means that housing suppliers can take on a
social enterprise role. Landlords may for example choose to focus on individual
social advancement or invest to enhance the environmental sustainability of their
dwellings.
Evaluations of co-production in housing are most often framed in terms of the
consumer function, but the effect of co-production on the other functions of housing
must also be taken into consideration, otherwise we will only see one side of the
story, in which only the advantages of this form will be emphasised. As we will see
in the following sections, co-production in housing can also have disadvantages.
Small German Housing Cooperatives: Et in Arcadia Ego?
This section shows how co-production is present in the organisations we studied and




The cooperatives that we researched often had something of the utopian idyll about
them. On some occasions that was clear as soon as we arrived. The first cooperative
that we visited had traditional red brick courtyards with benches, flowers and
balconies looking out. There were a couple of children’s bicycles lying on the
ground. Elsewhere, we visited colourfully painted rows of family houses, each with
a long strip of garden out back, tended attentively by the residents. As we walked
past, many of the residents were out clipping their hedges. In another location, we
visited an area of architecturally surprising modern housing with an abundance of
wide open green spaces and attractive communal areas. Of course, not all the
buildings owned by the cooperatives were as striking as these, but many
organisations prioritised architectural quality, and this was also a source of pride.
Many of them view the design and maintenance of the buildings they own simply as
part of their social responsibility.
There is a relatively low turnover among tenants. Germany is characterised by a
relatively high proportion of vacant housing, particularly in Eastern Germany, but
this is significantly lower among housing cooperatives than in other types of
housing providers. In the majority of residents of newer cooperatives, the residents
are still those who originally established them. The mix of residents in the
traditional Genossenschaften is fairly varied, but they are particularly popular
among certain groups. These are mainly households who can help each other
directly—the elderly, families with children, the handicapped. In addition, some
managers pointed out growing interest among single people over the age of 40,
particularly women. In fact, many of the managers were themselves middle-aged
women—a group that has traditionally played a significant role in voluntary work.
The cooperatives are particularly attractive to one- and two-person households with
a certain lifestyle—often these are people who could actually live independently but
who have much to gain from life in an integrated community. But where
cooperatives have already been established for a long time, the preference of the
residents for living in a certain neighbourhood can also be decisive.
Managers pride themselves in their active residents. This usually involves some
kind of self-help. Particularly in smaller communities, mention was made of mutual
assistance such as doing shopping for one another or babysitting for each other’s
children. In addition, during our interviews with many traditional housing
cooperatives, they referred to a wide range of organised activities—the elderly go
on coach trips together, as far afield as the Arctic Circle; games and treasure hunts
are organised for children; those who love walking set off to the woods together.
Every cooperative has a yearly winter street-party with mulled wine, and countless
cups of tea and coffee are enjoyed together.
Yet the larger Genossenschaften experienced familiar problems. All these
activities tended to depend on a hard core of mainly older residents. Many of the
members acted just like tenants of regular social housing, doing nothing more than
paying their monthly rent. Some cooperatives had begun experimenting with other
forms of participation such as funds to be spent by residents for which residents
could submit their own ideas. But here, too, falling levels of participation were a
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cause of concern. Nevertheless, the long average tenure of residents and the small-
scale of the organisations (achieved by, for example, transferring the democratic
decision-making structure to the level of individual housing complexes) contribute
to a relatively high level of active involvement. What is more, most small
cooperatives seem to be able to involve their members even more intensively—
members typically participate in management and forms of direct democracy
which are anchored in their organisational structure.
Born Out of Social Movements
There is a significant amount of variation among German housing cooperatives. The
clearest difference is between the older Genossenschaften and those that have been
instituted more recently. Many of the older cooperatives were founded in the second
half of the nineteenth century and vary greatly in size from a few thousand residents
to tens of thousands of dwellings, although they are smaller on average than the
municipal housing organisations. The newer cooperatives are significantly smaller,
with sometimes only a few hundred dwellings.
The older cooperatives have a history similar to that of non-profit housing
corporations in the Netherlands. During the industrial revolution, there was a
massive movement of workers to the urban centres, where they could not all be
housed. Families were squeezed together into tiny dwellings where living conditions
were often squalid. This was at its most severe in Berlin, where they joked: ‘There’s
a basement flat above us that’s going to be vacant soon’. Benevolent groups of
idealists, often with connections to the workers movement, founded new colonies
around the edges of town where they sought to promote community spirit and
mutual assistance, and provide housing with more light and air. Even today, many
of the cooperatives still have close political links to the Social Democratic Party
(SPD). Later, many of the Genossenschaften helped in the post-war reconstruction
of the cities which had been bombed. They were given state grants to build social
housing. But these grants come with strings attached: if a dwelling was built with
the aid of construction subsidies, the municipality was then entitled to house
whoever it wanted there—and these were not always neighbours of the sort that the
existing residents would look favourably on.
The newer Genossenschaften have their origins in more recent social movements.
For example, in cities such as Hamburg, collective forms of housing were a means
of tackling the issue of squats in the city. Following German reunification, there was
a new wave of Genossenschaften, supported by favourable local subsidy schemes
and spurred on by worries about housing being sold off to private property
speculators (the ‘cherry-pickers’). During the 1990s in Dresden, for example, the
municipality sold 47,000 dwellings from its stock of social housing to foreign
investment companies. Particularly in the eastern part of the new Germany,
residents took matters into their own hands and bought up existing housing estates
or plots of land. This type of initiative and the associated financial risks were linked
to a desire for security of tenure and self-determination, and for a home that would
never have to be sold again and where the only risks residents had to take were risks
they chose to take themselves. A number of new initiatives had links with the
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ecological ‘green’ movement and in these; sustainable buildings were given a high
priority.
In smaller organisation, the highest administrative organ is the general meeting of
members. In larger Genossenschaften, members are represented indirectly. Man-
agement duties are carried out by two or three members—in smaller cooperatives
they may work on a partly voluntary basis. The management has a supervisory
board which is consulted regularly and whose members have the power to dismiss
the management if necessary. The administrative structure consists mainly of
technical staff and caretakers. This democratic structure is fixed and replicated on a
smaller scale within individual housing complexes.
History has left its mark very clearly on the Genossenschaften, which have been
shaped by social transformations. The older cooperatives were a response to rapid
urbanisation during the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. The more
recently formed cooperatives were formed during the turbulent period that followed
German reunification and the globalisation of capital markets at the end of the
twentieth century. Few new Genossenschaften are being formed today because both
public and private forms of funding are less freely available. But it is possible that
the demographic turning point that is due to take place around the middle of the
twenty-first century may result in a new wave of Genossenschaften for two reasons.
First, in a shrinking housing market, the Genossenschaften will face lesser
competition from for-profit investors in the land market, the capital market and the
housing market. Second, the Genossenschaften seem to be particularly well suited to
combine the provision of housing services with the provision of care services for the
elderly. Hence, with an ageing population, the potential demand for sheltered
housing in cooperatives may rise.
Financial Background
In the field of housing, unlike in many other forms of service provision, it is possible
to function for long periods without the financial support of government or other
financial backing. Capital invested in housing generates its own income through
rents or the proceeds of sales. A very large investment is required ‘up-front’,
however, and support from external financiers is nearly always necessary for this.
The Genossenschaften vary in the degree to which they have received financial
support, but only a few have managed without any form of subsidy at all (when
implicit subsidies are included). After all, they cater for a stratum of the population
which is not the lowest in economic terms (or they would not be able have any
capital to contribute) but not particularly rich either (or they would probably choose
to own their own home). There is also very little room for manoeuvre: the
cooperatives promise their residents absolute security and any sale of the properties
is virtually out of the question. The scope for rent increases is also limited, both in
legal terms and by the financial position of the tenants. The legal support measures
from which the cooperatives used to benefit were abolished during the first decade
of this century. Direct subsidies do still exist, and come mainly from the regional
(La¨nder) or municipal levels of government. But even so, the cooperatives are
forced to keep an eye on every penny. Larger cooperatives are often financially
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stable, but the smaller ones are engaged in a constant struggle for survival. In a few
cases known to us, established cooperatives have lent their support to new
cooperatives during the start-up phase by providing advice, but there is no question
of any financial support between cooperatives. Not only are there limited resources
available to share, but cooperatives tend to focus on their own community and their
own immediate environment; this is both their strength and their weakness.
The main way in which cooperatives receive external financial support is through
favourable terms of credit. The largest risks are during the set-up phase. Many new
initiatives have had to be abandoned during this phase. Groups of residents who
wanted to set up cooperatives have had to rely almost entirely on state banks or
banks motivated by other ideals than purely profit alone. Regular banks have
remained reluctant to help and have only really shown interest once the risky phase
is over. A few years ago, bank managers invited a housing cooperative customer to
visit them and politely explained that the cooperative was no longer an attractive
customer for the bank, with only a few millions in credit (a further ironic twist in
this story: on the day of our interview with this cooperative in 2009, the very same
bank was about to collapse due to taking on subprime mortgage debts from the
United States).
In the past, some cities have also supported alternative forms of housing directly,
albeit sometimes on a temporary basis. For example, the municipality of Berlin
extended grants for set-up and renovation costs, which were later scrapped when the
city ran into financial problems. However, this did provide a window of opportunity
that enabled a number of cooperatives to get established. These kinds of
arrangements existed throughout Germany, although they have by no means always
been successful. Hamburg is an interesting case: the city government began to
encourage housing communities there in the 1980s. A proportion of land in the
city—which is in short supply and thus expensive—is set aside for collective
housing and a subsidised foundation supports residents who want to prepare
applications and get established. It is interesting to note that the traditional
cooperatives also began by setting up housing communities because it was one of
the few ways of being able to acquire land.
In short, cooperatives have to get established in a difficult and sometimes fickle
environment, where the support they require cannot always be found. Those
cooperatives that survive are only able to achieve some degree of stability over time.
So it seems that even this form of self-organisation requires a push to get it started.
But just how strong does that push need to be? As we shall discover, the answer to
that question involves finance, but has social aspects too.
At first glance, decision-making structures play an important role in this.
Cooperatives that have been set up more recently usually incorporate some form of
direct democracy or associational democracy through which members can be
involved in decisions on strategy and management. Older, larger cooperatives are
usually run on the basis of indirect representation. Their identity is influenced to a
significant extent by their democratic structure. Even in the traditional cooperatives,
members have the power to dismiss those that run them. However, the cooperatives
we researched did not differ radically from the housing corporations of the
Netherlands. The decision-making procedures were reminiscent of the original
Voluntas
123
housing associations and many of the initiatives at the level of individual housing
complexes have equivalent forms in the Netherlands.
More important than the formal structure are the informal ties between residents.
A number of cooperatives succeed in aligning their residents’ interests as
individuals and the interests of the community as a whole. The most important
factor in this is how residents’ involvement is built up over time. The smaller, newer
cooperatives are without exception based on communities which were already in the
process of being formed before the housing cooperative itself was established.
Sometimes these communities are strengthened further by some form of partici-
pation in the physical construction process itself. To a certain extent, social bonds
also have an important role to play in the more traditional cooperatives. They often
have a loyal core of resident families who, over the generations, have long made up
part of the community as a result of allocation mechanisms. In both cases, the
housing communities are based on established social and/or family ties.
Communities cannot be created, but they can evolve and thereafter can be
maintained. As our description has shown, housing cooperatives in Germany are
characterised by a combination of closed membership and community interests. The
original community is carefully protected by laying down clear boundaries for what
can be changed—both in terms of the residents and financial and economic
conditions. Members of the smaller cooperatives in particular have a clear interest in
preserving their own communities—and the survival of the community depends on
closed membership.
Controlling the Boundaries of the Community
We do not wish to give a distorted picture of the German Genossenschaften: not all
of them excel in building an active sense of community. Even in the housing
cooperatives of Germany, only a limited number of organisations have residents
who are highly active. But why do some organisations manage it, while others do
not?
It is true that residents stay in their homes longer, that there are close relations
between managers and residents, and that there was a relatively large amount of
contact between residents. Certainly in the smaller organisations, residents are
closely involved in management. This means of management is also essential to
smaller organisations as a means of cost reduction—they are kept running through
voluntary work and low turnover.
The German cooperatives exhibit all the classic hallmarks of strong communi-
ties: membership is—to some degree—closed, they are kept deliberately small in
scale and there is a clear community interest. Herein lies both the strength and the
weakness of housing cooperatives. This is a model from which there is much to
learn, but also one that comes with a price tag attached.
To start with, it should be emphasised that the communities have not come into
existence through the cooperatives, but rather the cooperatives have been built
around existing groups. New organisations were set up by groups of enterprising
individuals, who then went on to enlist more residents. These groups put a great
emphasis on relations between residents before the first brick was laid. In one of the
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cases we researched, the future residents of the cooperative were obliged to help
finish off the buildings in the final phase of construction so that they would get to
know each other properly. The cooperative is thus an instrument rather than an end
in itself. More importantly still, perhaps, the cooperative is the instrument of a
specific group which has its own goals.
What also plays an important role here is that cooperatives have remained
relatively small in scale. There are a few large cooperatives with over 10,000
homes, but two-thirds of all cooperatives own \20 % of the total stock of
cooperative housing, with the average cooperative extending to a total of 1,200
homes. The Wohnungsgenossenschaften generally have a strategy of limited
expansion, and sometimes limit themselves simply to renovation and maintenance.
This means that the number of homes that become vacant is consistently low.
This leads us logically to the question of how accessible the cooperative in fact
are. On this point, the cooperatives we researched provided some very contradictory
evidence. They invest a great deal in the transparency of their housing distribution
methods. Allocation decisions are usually published and explained. Sometimes
residents receive a personal letter to explain why they have not been allocated a
specific dwelling. In principle, anyone is free to apply for housing. The sum
required—between €500 and €1,000—is by no means excessive. Some cooperatives
offer a savings variant, which involves acting as a kind of bank for members as a
means of raising extra capital from them. There are no limits on income.
On paper, then, the cooperatives could hardly seem more welcoming. But in
practice, the situation is rather more complex. As mentioned, in reality very few
homes actually become vacant. In addition, those that do become vacant are
generally taken rather quickly. In principle, anyone who is prepared to accept the
obligatory share purchase can apply for the dwelling. In reality, though, many
family homes stay in the hands of the same families. It is common practice for
children who are born within the cooperative to be registered as members
immediately and to receive shares as gifts from their parents or godparents. Thirty
years later, they will have been registered for long enough to be entitled to a family
home. This intergenerational transfer of homes means that cooperatives often retain
an intergenerational core of residents who are closely involved. All of this is
perfectly within the rules of registration, but the length of registration is so long that
outsiders hardly ever get the chance to move into the most sought after family
houses. The only way into some Genosssenschaften is by being born into them or by
first occupying a single-person’s home. Those who want to move up to a larger
home are then put on a very long internal waiting list.
Conflict-Avoiding Behaviour
The low turnover in tenants of housing cooperatives is linked to the priority that
they accord to ownership rights. This means that there are seldom grounds for any
conflict. Increases in property values hardly exert any influence at all in the
cooperatives which we studied. Each member is obliged to invest a certain amount
in shares in the cooperative—a relatively low sum for traditional cooperatives, but
substantially more in new cooperatives. In return they receive an annual dividend,
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usually a fixed percentage of between 2 and 4 %. As a financing mechanism, this is
similar to a deposit savings account with a bank (since the credit crisis, we perhaps
ought to clarify this further: the type of bank account where you are guaranteed your
original deposit back). The difference is that members of German housing
cooperatives seldom leave and thus seldom have their original deposit returned. In
the event of a member leaving, he or she will only be given their deposit back. It is a
sober system which minimises conflicts concerning financial distribution and makes
profit-seeking strategies impossible.
In this way, the principle of security of tenure is translated towards every level.
This security is very much a key principle for cooperatives and it also leads to a
scrupulous investment policy. Any expansion of cooperatives is usually limited—
sometimes a small housing complex will be added. A conscious effort is made to
strike a balance between economies of scale and retaining the small scale of the
cooperative. This means that hardly any cross-subsidisation takes place—in
principle, each housing complex needs to be financially self-sufficient. This also
contributes to the conciliatory nature of relationships within the cooperatives—
existing organisations can gain from economies of scale through expansion, but do
not need to invest to do this.
Finally, the internal structure of cooperatives, particularly smaller ones, ensures
that residents are well informed about any developments. Communication plays an
essential role in organisations of all sizes—they organise meetings, hold open days,
write letters and employ wardens. This does not mean that managers and members
are of equal rank, however. The difference in the levels of knowledge between the
two groups is enormous even under this form of housing ownership, and it cannot be
denied that some managers act paternalistically. But the bottom line is that residents
are secure in their homes and ultimately they have the power to dismiss managers.
This too gives residents a feeling being able to decide their own destiny.
A Limited Focus
Even the most dynamic Genossenschaften have a view which is restricted only to
their own neighbourhood—they are very active within their own ‘territory’ but no
further. There is also criticism on the part of local authorities. ‘‘Our experience is
that there is little willingness to feel responsible. If there was coordination between
them, that would be different, but often they don’t even know what their immediate
neighbour is doing’’. The cooperatives look inwardly, first of all, and have neither
the financial capacity nor the personnel to take on a broader role. Certainly, the
cooperatives are islands of stability with a favourable influence on their immediate
environment. Their residents are relatively closely involved in managing their
housing complexes and the streets around them. They attract volunteers, are
attentive and reliable, and maintain their properties well—the perfect neighbours,
one might say. But when it comes to broader concerns like urban renewal, it is the
project developers and the municipal housing authorities that call the shots, not the
Genossenschaft. Although the Genossenschaften have their local federations, it
should be emphasised that these federative organisations and the individual
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cooperatives are more oriented towards satisfying the housing needs and demands
of their members than towards contributing to local and regional housing issues.
Conclusion: The Conditions Required for Co-production
Our research has focused on the question under what conditions co-production in
housing can succeed, based on a study of German Wohnungsgenossenschaften
(housing cooperatives). Almost all of the cooperatives resembled the ‘small-scale
societies’ that Mary Douglas referred to, with high levels of volunteering and
collective engagement. Interpersonal contact was important and was emphasised
consistently by our respondents. While a certain degree of altruism probably played
a role, what is more important is that in this type of small-scale community the
shared interests of the cooperative were generally consistent with individual self-
interests. This appears to confirm the general observation that institutional
arrangements that appeal to mixed motives are the most sustainable (Le Grand
2003).
The conditions for successful co-production that we found match several of those
that Ostrom (1990, 2005) previously identified for the successful management of
common-pool resources. Specifically:
• The boundaries of the cooperatives and the eligibility criteria that potential
members needed to satisfy were well defined;
• Rules concerning the use of the provision, including the withdrawal of housing
services and decisions concerning new investments, were adapted to local
circumstances;
• The cooperatives had simple collective choice mechanisms and decision rules,
often based on direct democracy; monitoring of the management board was
directly accessible by the members of the Genossenschaften and the general
meeting usually also served as an effective social infrastructure for the
resolution of potential conflicts;
• They were explicitly based on the right of communities to organise themselves.
The Genossenschaften—once they got off the ground—were capable of
surviving in the long term. Managing their existing housing stock sustainably
was seen as being more important than making risky investments to attract
potential new members or groups.
• The Genossenschaften seldom disposed of the financial means to initiate risky
new investments, and their internal decision-making structures had an intrin-
sically conservative effect.
In almost all cases, the cooperatives have chosen to pursue a cautious investment
policy. They focus almost exclusively on the physical maintenance of the housing
and on promoting social involvement among residents—they ignore considerations
such as service provision, freedom of choice and profit making. This means that
their model is by no means attractive for everyone. Indeed, some tenants regard it as
positively restrictive. For others, the cooperatives are the ideal form of housing
organisation. Our data suggested that the model appealed specifically to certain
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social groups (e.g. families with young children, the elderly, single middle-aged
women). Within the communities, the German housing cooperatives we studied
were extremely good at mobilising residents for collective action.
Yet there were also limitations and short-comings. To begin with, the
cooperatives made limited use of their capital. As indicated, the cooperatives
emphasised security of tenure above all else, which meant that they avoided making
any risky investments. There was very limited cross-subsidisation, or none at all:
each community was expected to provide for itself. The emphasis on security of
tenure also meant that the sale of properties was often virtually impossible. On the
one hand, that strategy leads to a high level of stability and a relatively low level of
conflicts between members; on the other hand, it is not the most productive strategy
for activating the capital invested in the housing stock. A second drawback was the
limited reach of community spirit. The common experience was that it usually went
no further than the next block. There is no denying that within these boundaries, the
German Genossenschaften were home to very pleasant communities with a high
degree of social involvement, many volunteers and a positive influence on their
immediate environment. Yet essentially they remained friendly versions of the
‘gated community’, in which the ‘in-group’ assumes a central position. Whether that
makes the model attractive or not, and for whom, is a normative topic for further
discussion.
In other words, co-production in housing comes at a price. The ideal housing
organisation would be one that invests broadly across the whole city, where
residents share in the return on capital investments and yet still have a thriving
community, happy to tend the communal gardens and clear the litter with a cheerful
song. But it is probably the stuff that dreams are made of. The conditions that
optimise performance for fulfilling one function are not compatible with the
optimisation of performance in terms of other functions. Enabling residents to share
in the rise in the value of their property is almost impossible to reconcile with
maintaining the closed communities that are needed to preserve social stability.
This brings us to the question whether it is at all possible to achieve a better
balance between social efficiency and social equity (efficiency and equity across
different communities), while at the same time benefitting from the more responsive
intra-communitarian quality of the cooperatives towards the needs and demands of
their residents or tenants. This may be possible by decoupling the different levels
within one organisation from one another. It would be unrealistic to expect a
community to form around a total housing stock of, for example, 5,000 dwellings.
Equally unrealistic would be to expect an organisation with a stock of 100 dwellings
to play a role in the development of the city as a whole. However, a provider with
5,000 dwellings could accommodate an organisation for a housing community of
100 dwellings. In Hamburg, for example, some large cooperatives have allowed
smaller housing communities a place within their housing stock when those
communities are housed within one building or within a clearly demarcated area. At
a lower scale level, it may be possible for existing housing providers to provide the
conditions necessary for communities to form and co-production to occur. If such an
approach were to prove successful, existing housing providers could function as a
roof over the heads of co-production initiatives at lower levels.
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Perhaps this process could enable these organisations to realise the potential they
have to bring about social innovation without having to relinquish their traditional
position, which over the years they have worked so hard to attain.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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